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ABSTRACT
Background Offering ﬁnancial incentives to achieve
medication adherence in patients with severe mental
illness is controversial.
Aims To explore the views of different stakeholders on
the ethical acceptability of the practice.
Method Focus group study consisting of 25 groups with
different stakeholders.
Results Eleven themes dominated the discussions and
fell into four categories: (1) ‘wider concerns’, including
the value of medication, source of funding, how patients
would use the money, and a presumed government
agenda behind the idea; (2) ‘problems requiring clear
policies’, comprising of practicalities and assurance that
incentives are only one part of a tool kit; (3) ‘challenges
for research and experience’, including effectiveness, the
possibility of perverse incentives, and impact on the
therapeutic relationship; (4) ‘inherent dilemmas’ around
fairness and potential coercion.
Conclusions The use of ﬁnancial incentives is likely to
raise similar concerns in most stakeholders, only some of
which can be addressed by empirical research and clear
policies.
INTRODUCTION
Maintenance antipsychotic medication has been
shown to be effective in the treatment of patients
with psychotic disorders. It was unequivocally
recommended by the National Institute for Clinical
Excellence (NICE) guidelines,
1 yet adherence to
medication remains problematic. Several strategies
(eg, compliance therapy, psychotherapy, psycho-
education) have been tested to improve adherence,
but have been shown to have, at best, a limited
effect.
23
Hospital re-admission,
4 social withdrawal, low
quality of life and disruptive or self-harming
behaviour
5 have been identiﬁed as some of the
possible consequences of non-adherence to medi-
cation. In an analysis of serious untoward incidents
in England,
5 non-adherence to treatment was
a feature of at least one-quarter of suicides and
homicides by people with mental illness. New
strategies are therefore required to achieve medica-
tion adherence in some patients with psychotic
disorder.
However, adherence to antipsychotic medication
is a concept that provokes strong reactions. First, it
raises the concern that non-adherence represents an
autonomous choice, deserving respect and protec-
tion in itself. On this account, the very idea of
adherence is a weakly disguised paternalistic
notion. It is a problem only for the doctor, whose
patient is resisting adhering to expert advice.
Second, non-adherence may indicate a reasoned
decision not to take medication in order to avoid
potentially serious side effects. Third, it may indi-
cate a reasoned decision not to take medication on
the basis that the patient disagrees with the nega-
tive valorisation on the illness experience, and with
the diagnosis itself. There is merit in all of these
views, but they overlook the real and dangerous
consequences of non-adherence, and the extent to
which patients themselves endorse their diagnosis
and treatment plans but ﬁnd adherence difﬁcult in
practice.
Another concern about the use of antipsychotic
medication relates to the role of coercion in
psychiatric treatment, through both legal and
informal means. Finding means to encourage
adherence to treatment that are not coercive is
important. Some methods of treatment are more
coercive in their effect than others; a depot medi-
cation ties a patient into a course of treatment for
a longer time without the possibility of stopping
treatment than does daily pill-taking. Even if it is
conceded that psychiatric treatment can be inher-
ently coercive, given the nature of psychiatric
diagnosis and the background availability of coer-
cive powers enshrined in law, there is still value in
engaging the patient as an autonomous person and
of using minimally coercive means of engagement
and treatment so far as possible.
6
Evidence from the USA demonstrates that
ﬁnancial incentives can substantially improve
adherence to treatment in various medical condi-
tions.
7 There is little literature on their use to
achieve medication adherence in patients with
psychotic disorders.
8 Out of ﬁve patients where
adherence had not been achieved by any other
means in East London,
9 four accepted ﬁnancial
incentives and had improved medication adherence
with favourable clinical outcomes.
The report triggered an intensive debate on
whether offering ﬁnancial incentives to achieve
medication adherence in patients with psychotic
disorders is acceptable.
10 In a survey of assertive
outreach team managers
11 42% felt that offering
incentives would be ‘unethical’. Arguments
presented by Szmukler (2009) on the use of ﬁnan-
cial incentives included ‘coercion’ of the patient,
‘incommensurable values’ whereby the offer of
ﬁnancial incentives degrades ‘an aspect of respect
for the person’, ‘exploitation’ of the patient and
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Clinical ethics‘fairness’ of offering ﬁnancial incentives to some patients and
not others.
12 Others claim that ﬁnancial incentives should be
interpreted as a reward and are less coercive than existing forms
of leverage, such as enforced hospital admission.
13 Before a wider
application of ﬁnancial incentives in patients with psychotic
disorders is considered, it appears essential to identify the
attitudes, concerns and opinions of different relevant stake-
holder groups in mental healthcare. This study aimed to explore
and understand such views in a systematic manner using
a qualitative methodology.
METHOD
Data were collected using a focus group methodology, as this
allows the exploration of participant attitudes and opinions, as
well as facilitating the generation and speciﬁcation of ideas on
ad e ﬁned topic. Purposive sampling was used to include as wide
a range of relevant stakeholder groups as possible.
Participants
Staff and patients from community mental health teams and
assertive outreach teams were recruited to 18 focus groups. The
teams cover inner city, suburban and more rural areas, with
different levels of deprivation. We also recruited non-executive
directors of a Mental Health Trust, patient forum representa-
tives, health economists, family and informal carers, and
voluntary organisation representatives (the ﬁnal two through
the mental health charity organisation Rethink).
Consultant psychiatrists and trainee psychiatrists were iden-
tiﬁed through staff lists. For the recruitment of other staff, we
approached 18 community mental health teams and nine
assertive outreach teams. Eighteen teams expressed an interest
in participating. We presented the project at existing team
meetings. One team declined participation. Staff names and
contact details were obtained from the team managers. An
invitation to participate in a focus group was then sent to staff
via email and followed up with a telephone call. Service users
were approached by staff and/or team managers to participate in
one of two focus groups, while a third group were recruited
through their links with a patient forum.
Procedure and data collection
Focus groups were conducted between November 2007 and
December 2008. Each group lasted approximately 1 h and had
between three and 10 participants. All groups were conducted
by an experienced facilitator and co-facilitator, digitally recorded
and later transcribed verbatim. All followed the same procedure.
After the initial introduction of all participants, the facilitator
presented the following research question to the group: ‘What
are your initial thoughts on paying non-adherent seriously mentally ill
service users to take their medication?’, which was discussed for
10e25 min. Following this, a case vignette describing a patient
with a psychotic disorder and problematic medication adherence
was introduced. The vignette was deliberately left vague to help
participants express their own views and ask questions of the
scenario. The facilitator encouraged the participants to explore
alternative arguments to those presented within the group, and
if appropriate, the participants were challenged on their views.
The vignette is presented in box 1.
Analysis
Data collection and analysis occurred simultaneously and focus
groups continued until all key stakeholder views had been
represented and saturation of data was reached. Three of the
researchers (JS, AB, SM) repeatedly read the ﬁrst six transcripts
and independently deﬁned a preliminary coding scheme, which
was discussed in the research team. The ﬁnal coding scheme was
generated by an iterative process as further data were collected
until saturation was reached. Data were analysed by the
researchers independently reading the transcripts and coding all
material using NVivo7 (QRS) software, with continuous
comparison and discussion where discrepancies arose. The codes
were then linked and collapsed into broader themes. The
research team discussed and analysed the link between the early
dense codes and broader themes to ensure conceptual clarity and
consistency across the themes and further recoding where
required.
RESULTS
Sample
A total of 25 focus groups were carried out with 139 partici-
pants, including 27 service users, 16 carers, 76 community
mental health or assertive outreach team staff, and 20 other
mental health service stakeholders. The sample captured a range
of experience of staff with the mean length of service being
13 years (ranging from 5 months to 30 years). Patients had been
using mental health services for an average of 15 years (ranging
from 4 to 30 years). Twenty-one groups contained a homoge-
nous sample of the following participants: patients (ﬁve groups),
carers (three groups), consultant psychiatrists (three groups),
psychiatrists in training, nurses (two groups), social workers and
occupational therapists, psychologists, community team
managers, voluntary organisation representatives, patient forum
representatives, health economists and non-executive directors
of a mental health trust. Four groups were each run with staff
from an existing team to reﬂect a natural multidisciplinary team
setting. Participants were aged between 21 and 76 (mean
43) years and 55% of the sample was female.
General results
Although groups varied substantially in their atmosphere, exact
discourse and aspects of the argument, there was a high level of
saturation across the groups regarding the content of the
concerns raised. Nearly all of the major themes were brought up
in every group.
The transcriptions generated a total of 23 codes, which
informed further analysis and identiﬁcation of 11 major themes
Box 1 Case vignette used to stimulate focus group
discussions
A 25 year old person with a 6-year history of severe mental illness
has been admitted to hospital on three occasions. On two of these
the person was detained against their own will, although legally.
The person agrees to take medication (depot) when staying in
hospital and for a few months after discharge. However, the person
starts to become unavailable at the time of the depot, and then
refuses the medication.
At the same time, the person also stops attending a work skills
group, and is no longer taking care of personal hygiene or looking
after the ﬂat properly. This leads to the landlord throwing the
person out of the ﬂat, and a period of time when the person
becomes mentally very unwell again. If the person’s mental health
does not improve, hospital admission seems necessary.
Should the person be offered payment to take the medication?
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Clinical ethicsdescribing the key discussion threads of the groups. Themes fell
into one of four main categories depending on the nature of the
concern and the possibilities to address and further explore
them. The categories consisted of ‘wider concerns’, ‘problems
requiring policies’, ‘challenges for research and experience’ and
‘inherent dilemmas’. The categorisation did not consider how
serious, important or complex the themes were. The focus
groups, the four categories of themes, and all themes with
illustrating quotes are summarised in ﬁgure 1.
Wider concerns
Four major themes reﬂected wider concerns that were linked to
the issue of ﬁnancial incentives. These themes went beyond the
speciﬁc clinical problem and concerned more general issues
associated with it.
There were some very critical views on the value of medication
in psychiatric treatment, expressed with particular intensity by
psychologists and some patients. They felt that medication
should be prescribed with more caution, if at all, and that
a ‘medical model’ was too dominant in mental healthcare.
The question as to where the money for the provision of
incentives would come from led to concerns that other impor-
tant services and interventions might suffer ﬁnancially if money
were spent on incentivising patients.
Further concerns were raised that patients may use the money
to buy drugs and alcohol, which may then have a negative
impact on their mental health. Some participants thought that
if it could be ensured that the money was used for therapeutic
purposes, such as accessing recreational activities, then such
a practice would be more acceptable.
Finally, there were repeated assumptions, particularly in non-
clinician groups, that the idea of offering ﬁnancial incentives
was brought up by the ‘state’ or more speciﬁcally the ‘govern-
ment’ to control patients and save money by reducing
Figure 1 Focus groups, categories,
emerging themes and illustrating
quotes.
Effects on the therapeutic relationship 
(18 groups)
“it’s about having a collaborative 
relationship, not one having more control 
over the other...” (Social worker)
Effectiveness (23 groups)
“It doesn’t really make sense if everything 
else has been tried what’s to say that paying 
them is gonna make them take the 
medication anyway…” (user representative)
Part of toolkit (24 groups)
“but it gives us an additional tool that we can 
use to build engagement continuously with 
the client…” (Nurse)
Government agenda (15 groups)
“I’d think it’s politically driven, I do think 
there is definitely a government agenda…” 
(Team manager)
Use to which incentive is put (20 groups)
“They can go out and buy drugs, they can go 
out and …I don’t know….” (Health 
economist)
Opportunity cost (16 groups) 
“that’s a waste of resource that could be 
spent better on other things in the health 
service” (Non-executive director)
Value of medication ( 21 groups)
“….that patient may not benefit from that 
medication and we know that many patients 
do not benefit from that medication” 
(Consultant psychiatrist)
Perverse incentive (24 groups)
“…could you though potentially get people 
stopping the medication who are, usually 
would take it…” (Multidisciplinary Team)
Wider concerns 
Practicalities (24 groups)
“how much money do you mean and how 
often would you be giving it to them?” 
(Carer)
Coercion (24 groups)
“you don’t want to take the medication but 
I’m gonna play to something that you cannot 
refuse because you really need this £50 
so….” (Psychiatrist in training) Inherent dilemmas 
Problems 
requiring policies 
Challenges for 
evidence and 
experience
Equity (18 groups) 
“but then…you’ve got a group of service 
users and some of them are being paid to 
take the medication and some aren’t, there’d 
be mutiny” (Patient)
Psychiatrists in 
training (1 group) 
FOCUS GROUPS                             CATEGORIES THEMES WITH QUOTES AND FREQUENCIES
(25 groups with 139 participants) 
Patients (5 groups) 
Carers (3 groups) 
Nurses (2 groups) 
Consultant
psychiatrists 
(3 groups)  
Team managers  
(1 group) 
Psychologists 
(1 group) 
Social workers
(1 group) 
Health economists 
(1 group) 
Non-executive
directors (1 group) 
Voluntary 
organisations  
(1 group) 
User forum 
representatives  
(1 group) 
Multidisciplinary
teams (4 groups) 
J Med Ethics 2010;36:463e468. doi:10.1136/jme.2009.035071 465
Clinical ethicsalternative services. While the term ‘government’ directly
featured in 15 groups, only one participant supposed an interest
of pharmaceutical companies as a potential driver.
These themes were categorised as wider concerns because the
question of ﬁnancial incentives was speciﬁcally on cases in
which medication was supposed to be effective, and would be
irrelevant if medication was deemed unhelpful for a given
patient. The question of where the money for the incentives
would come from applies to any new healthcare intervention
that needs funding. The concerns about what patients might
spend the money on is addressed by legislation and civil rights,
according to which people with severe mental illness have the
same entitlement as anyone else to spend their money on what
they see ﬁt. Finally, the speculation on political drivers behind
the idea of ﬁnancial incentives is separate from the clinical
practice of whether it should be considered by a clinician for
a given patient. All these concerns highlight a difﬁculty in
evaluating incentive schemes: separation of the evaluation of the
incentive scheme from evaluation of the context in which it is
used and from evaluation of the treatment or behaviour being
incentivised is very difﬁcult in practice, even if the distinctions
are clear analytically.
Problems requiring policies
Two major themes addressed issues that would require further
clariﬁcation by precise policies.
Participants frequently raised questions about the practical-
ities of offering ﬁnancial incentives and the feasibility of such
a practice. They wondered how the incentives would be
administered, how receiving money would affect beneﬁt
schemes, and over what period of time the incentives should be
used.
If the ﬁnancial incentives were seen as a reasonable option and
‘part of a (clinician’s) tool kit’, there was still an emphasis that
safeguards have to be in place to ensure that it was used only as
a ‘last resort’ when all other efforts had failed. It should not
become an ‘easy option’. There was a consensus that every
attempt should be made to understand why a patient had
stopped taking medication so that options for alternative
interventions could be explored.
These problems suggest that the acceptability of an incentive
scheme can be improved by improving its design. They also
underline the disquiet that incentive schemes produce, even
when the context and design of such schemes are fully clariﬁed.
A pragmatic objection to an incentive scheme is possibly easier
to articulate than a moral argument.
Challenges for evidence and experience
Three themes concerned issues that may, at least in theory,
receive some clariﬁcation through evidence from research and
clinical experience. While some of the issues may be addressed in
conventional trials, others may be more difﬁcult to study.
Participants frequently wondered whether the practice would
work and indeed lead to higher medication adherence. Many
participants welcomed the idea of further research to establish
the effectiveness of the scheme and stated that this was the
most important factor in determining the acceptability of
offering ﬁnancial incentives. Others dismissed this as a non-
starter and were opposed regardless of the potential effective-
ness, arguing that they could not see how it would work in
practice or that it was wrong for reasons captured in other
themes of the analysis.
Similarly, concerns were raised that offering ﬁnancial incen-
tives to those who were non-adherent could have a negative
impact on those who were medication-adherent, with the
potential of encouraging non-adherence in order to obtain
money. Participants with less direct and personal experience of
community mental healthcare of psychotic disorders, either as
patients or clinicians, were particularly likely to argue that
ﬁnancial incentives might encourage false reporting of ill health,
and conversely a reluctance to report side effects and negative
consequences of taking medication.
Clinicians in particular wondered whether offering ﬁnancial
incentives might affect the therapeutic relationship and under-
mine a collaborative process with the patient. In addition, there
was wide concern about whether being offered incentives to
take medication would lead to a more negative attitude towards
medication, instead of a more positive one due to experiences
with helpful medication effects.
Inherent dilemmas
This fourth category contains two themes that appear inher-
ently linked with offering ﬁnancial incentives to achieve medi-
cation adherence in patients with psychotic disorders and
cannot be clariﬁed through policies or research. Rather they
articulate concerns of moral principle, which are not evidence-
dependent.
Financial incentives were seen as a ‘powerful tool’ in enabling
behavioural change. Some stakeholders felt ‘uncomfortable’ at
the thought of using money in therapeutic practice, particularly
as it targeted the poor and could be used to inﬂuence the deci-
sions of vulnerable people. Some participants suggested that the
use of incentives other than money would feel more comfort-
able, with vouchers being a popular alternative. A core issue was
whether the introduction of money would motivate patients to
make decisions that may go against their beliefs on what was
right for them. It was felt that patients might continue to take
the medication despite intolerable side effects. Some partici-
pants, however, saw money for medication as more of a reward
or ‘compensation’ for having to put up with side effects, while
others emphasised that service users still had a choice over
whether to take the money and therefore take the medication.
This led to the question of who would be responsible for the
patient’s decision in such a situation and for potential negative
long-term effects of the medication. In this context ﬁnancial
incentives were potentially coercive. Views were inconsistent as
to whether such a form of ‘coercion’ would be preferable to
formal methods of compulsory treatment using the Mental
Health Act. Mainly clinicians argued that in practice many other
methods of covert coercion and indirect material incentives,
such as invitations to lunch or help with ﬁlling in forms to get
beneﬁts, are routinely used to encourage medication and do not
draw criticism.
Finally, the question of whether it is fair to offer some
patients money to take their medication while others do it
without receiving money was raised and frequently seen as
a matter of principle.
DISCUSSION
The study illustrates what issues are likely to be raised when
ﬁnancial incentives to achieve medication adherence in non-
adherent patients with psychotic disorders are discussed. Each
stakeholder group covered most of the same discussion threads,
albeit with different emphasis and arguments, but there were no
clear differences between groups. The concerns expressed in the
11 themes need to be addressed whenever a wider application of
the practice is considered. The relevance of these themes is
twofold. First, they arise prior to any consideration of the
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treatment. Therefore, they shape the perception and argument
around the topic of incentives in an important way. They are also
broadly consistent with academic arguments about incentives.
One methodological question arising in our study was whether
we were ‘promoting’ the use of incentives, or whether our prior
attitudes to antipsychotic drug therapy were relevant in framing
and analysing the issues under investigation. Obviously, a degree
of reﬂexivity is necessary here. But the very concern raised about
whether we are in some way biased or whether our framing
prejudged the discussion is itself something that was discussed in
the groups, and underscores the way in which prior moral atti-
tudes frame the debate in ways that seem rather insensitive to
evidence, even where evidence should be relevant.
Strengths of the study are that very different stakeholder
groups were included, saturation was reached, and the results
appear plausible as a criterion of validity. Weaknesses are the
general limitations of focus group methodology and the fact that
very few participants had any experience with using ﬁnancial
incentives, so that most concerns had a speculative nature.
The debate in the groups raised wider issues and speciﬁc
concerns, which to some extent reﬂect a suspicion that offering
ﬁnancial incentives might not only be a desperate attempt by
clinicians to help patients in whom all other means have failed,
but also that there are improper motives and even a government
agenda behind it. One can only speculate whether this is inﬂu-
enced by the public nature of the NHS, the way that the NHS
has been run using top-down initiatives, and the general polit-
icising of health service issues in the UK. Aside from health
system-speciﬁc issues, it was not clear how far participants
attitudes were driven primarily by concern for the individual
patient’s well-being and respect for their autonomy, and how far
they were shaped by a concern for social justice and equity in
ways better captured by a public health model of the use of
incentives.
14 Having said that, most of the concerns identiﬁed
relate to concerns on individual behaviours and attitudes, and
for between-patient considerations of fairness.
Whether offering ﬁnancial incentives is an acceptable option or
not is an issue for an ethical debate, and the ﬁndings of this study
can inform such a debate. Since most of the ethical arguments
raised seem to relate most to a clinical frame of reference
concerned with the individual patient, a normative model drawn
from medical ethics may best capture the nature of these
concerns. A standard framework for describing such concerns is
that of Beauchamp and Childress,
15 who suggested four ethical
principles guiding the consideration of healthcare interventions:
autonomy, beneﬁcence, non-maleﬁcence and justice.
Each of these principles has been addressed by the results. The
autonomy of the patient might be affected through a coercive
effect of ﬁnancial incentives with unclear responsibilities for
potentially harmful medication effects, especially in the long
term. While it may be argued that the model of coercion implied
in the respondents’ discussions was inchoate and arguably quite
imperfect from a philosophical point of view, notions of coercion
were frequently invoked and appeared highly salient.
Beneﬁcence overlaps with the issue of effectiveness, but is also
linked to the frequently discussed question of whether offering
ﬁnancial incentives is in the interest of the individual patient or
the public at large. Ethically, only the former might be seen as
a justiﬁcation to implement the practice in a voluntary treat-
ment setting. In addition, capacity to make the decision and
provide informed consent would be required.
Several aspects concerned non-maleﬁcence, referring to
potential harm. This may affect patients on such a scheme
through the withholding of time-consuming alternative
methods, more complicated relationships with their clinicians,
more negative attitudes towards medication, or the harmful use
of the money for drugs. It may also affect other patients who
might become non-adherent to be eligible for ﬁnancial
incentives.
The issue of justice was directly mentioned as some partici-
pants found it unfair that some patients received money to take
medication and others did not. Such a position may be chal-
lenged by arguing that resources for health interventions need to
be distributed following the needs of the individual concerned.
The four-principles approach is only one approach to thinking
about the ethics of medical treatment, and of incentives, but it
has the virtues of simplicity and clarity. Although frequently
criticised for being simplistic, it does help make sense of the
‘ordinary ethics’ recorded in the focus group discussions.
16
Relevant stakeholder groups expressed concerns about using
ﬁnancial incentives to achieve medication adherence in patients
with psychotic disorders. If the practice is to be used more
widely despite these concerns, ﬁnancial incentives should be
regarded as an option for a clinician and patient in an individual
case, rather than be implemented following a general guideline.
The study has clearly shown why offering ﬁnancial incentives to
achieve medication adherence will remain a controversial
subject. While the ethical decision may depend on various
factors, including the central question as to whose interest is
being served, some of the concerns can be addressed by precise
policies with appropriate safeguards, and others might be clari-
ﬁed in further research. Our analysis here is not intended to be
a full ethical analysis of the issues, but rather to identify which
issues are salient in stakeholders’ appraisals of the use of
incentives to promote medication adherence, and to examine
how these arguments are used to shape their understanding of
the use of incentives. The ‘lay ethical theories’ of our respon-
dents leave open difﬁcult questions about the nature of coercion
and the distinctions between coercion, inducement, persuasion
and rational response to behavioural and cognitive biases. It is
possible, for instance, that an a priori concern with coercion in
psychiatric practice disposes our respondents to identify new
behavioural interventions as presumptively coercive. This would
not mean that incentives are coercive on the best theoretical
analysis of coercion, but it would mean that stakeholders are
more likely to perceive, interpret and evaluate incentives using
a ‘coercion frame’ rather than a ‘rational choice frame’. Since
autonomy in the thin sense of the capacity to make unforced
decisions made in light of the person’s own preferences, and in
the thick sense of being able to live in light of a coherent,
reﬂectively endorsed set of values, is at the heart of psychiatry, it
should not surprise us that a complex negotiation over what it
requires takes place when incentives are proposed.
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